Comprehensive tests for space applications software are costly but extremely necessary. These software must be reliable and produced within schedule and budget. In a tentative of make the space mission software development for space agencies and industries more costeffective, the European Committee for Space Standardization (ECSS) has been compiling a set of standards that specify the common core of some space application systems. Once the set of services is standardized, the conformance problem is raised. In this paper we present a testing process for standardized services, which is based on the IS-9646 standard for ISO protocol conformance testing. The process includes an approach to derive test and fault cases by combining conformance testing concepts with the software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) technique. One advantage of this process is the generation of a re-usable abstract test suite which improves the testing effectiveness. Reliability and convergence in the test cases are increased the more the tests are applied. Additionally, the evaluation of the software behavior under external faults may be performed under the repeatable set of fault cases. The approach is illustrated with abstract test and fault cases derived for the telecommand verification service stated in the ECSS-E-70-41A standard. These services, successfully adopted in many missions, define the application-level communication between on-board and ground applications.
, shown in gray in Figure 2 . This system comprises 5 layers, from the Physical to the Packetization layers, providing all the necessary controls to accurately deliver the telecommand (TC) packet that has been generated on the ground to the on-board application process. The Telemetry (TM) Packets deliver the service reports that have been generated on-board to the on-ground application process. The Command Link Control Word (CLCW) and the Command Link Transfer Unit (CLTU) are intermediate formats supporting the protocol communication.
The structure of the PUS services over the leveled CCSDS protocols is similar to the ISO-OSI basic reference model 7 , so the conformance testing process defined in the IS-9646 standard seems suitable, since points of control and observation (PCOs) be established. PCOs define the system testability as they allow the tester to control and observe the occurrence of testing events.
The Packet Utilization Services are not only applied in different missions, but also in different software implementations within a space mission. For example, they may be applied to the embedded software of the Onboard Data Handling Computer (OBDH) as well as to the satellite simulator. The simulator provides the same set of services in the module simulating the OBDH behavior, when it is used to replace the real satellite during the Satellite Control System testing and operator training. 
III.CoFI: Conformance-and-Fault-Injection Test Process
A testing process is a "course of action to be taken to perform testing", according to IEEE Software Standards. It consists of specifying the test cases, adjusting the test cases to the test execution mean, executing the test, analyzing the results and producing reports about the test execution. In the CoFI testing process the evaluation power of the conformance testing given in the IS-9646 standard was extended with the SWIFI to accelerate the rate of exceptional events.
A.Conformance testing
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) have standardized procedures for communication protocols with practical guides for conformance testing. These standards, which are stated in the IS-9646 standard for Conformance Testing Methodology and Framework 8, 9 have allowed testing laboratories around the world to perform ISO protocol testing and certification.
In the IS-9646, the testing process comprises activities in which abstract test suites are derived to certify a 
B.Software-implemented fault-injection
Space software applications require a high degree of reliability especially when running on-board of a spacecraft.
The Software-implemented fault-injection technique (SWIFI) has been widely used in the dependability validation process of critical systems 12 . SWIFI has been adopted to accelerate the rate of fault events during testing, which enables software designers to identify and remove the faults of the implementation under test. External faults are submitted to verify the system behavior under the presence of the faults, and to remove the uncovered failures in the implementation and/or in the design. The SWIFI may also be used for fault forecasting purposes, in which the faults are injected to rate the efficiency of the operational behavior of the implemented fault tolerant mechanisms 13 .
Why use SWIFI in conformance testing?
The first reason to incorporate SWIFI in the testing process was to accelerate the rate of problems occurring in the unit under test. Moreover, the SWIFI allows testers to reproduce common faults encountered in the space context like memory and communication faults. Another reason is to improve the evaluation of the system not only for conformance but also for observation of its behavior under the presence of external faults. Although the likelihood of a particular fault (or the entire faultload) cannot be predetermined, and hence an absolute conclusion about the dependability of the software cannot be drawn, this technique represents a step towards more reliable software behavior. SWIFI also has the advantage of being easily expandable to new classes of faults and it is free of physical interference as well. Moreover, fault injection has proved to be invaluable in space application testing due to its capability to model common space environment faults which commonly occur in a system's operational phase 14 . A prose description of a well-defined objective of testing, focusing on a single conformance requirement or a set of them.
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Test Notation
The notation used to describe the abstract test case -implementation independent.
Abstract Test Suite (ATS)
A set of Abstract Test Cases, referring to a particular test method. An abstract test case is a complete and independent specification of the actions required to achieve a specific test purpose. It is complete in the sense that it is sufficient to enable a test verdict unambiguously for each potentially observable test outcome. It is independent in the sense that it should be possible to execute the derived executable test case in isolation from other such test cases.
Implement. Conformance Statement (ICS)
A statement made by the supplier of an implementation, listing the capabilities that have been implemented.
Implementation extra Information for Testing (IXIT)
A statement made by the supplier of an implementation which contains all of the information related to the UUT and its test environment, necessary to execute the test suites.
Parameterized Executable Tests Suite (PETS)
A selected set of test cases, in which all test cases have been parameterized in accordance with the relevant ICS.
Test Report
A document giving details of the testing that has been carried out, using a particular ATS. It lists all the abstract test cases, identifies those for which corresponding executable test cases were run, and presents the test verdicts.
UUT
Unit under testing.
D.The activity description
The CoFI testing process comprises six activities presented below.
1) Define Test Purpose: the preparation for testing phase starts with the definition of test purposes. This activity receives the service standard specification and produces the test purposes. According to IS9646, a test purpose is the test objective. Here, the test purpose summarizes the functionality of one service stated in the standard. For the "Telecommand Verification" service standardized in ECSS-E-7041A, the corresponding test purpose is "to verify the telecommand execution", which defines the objective of this service.
2) Specify Abstract Test Suite (ATS):
This activity receives the test purposes and produces an abstract test
suite. An ATS is provided for each ECSS-E-70-4A service. The ATS comprises test cases and fault cases which are implementation-independent and focused on the content of the specification. Scenarios are identified for one test purpose, taking into account the service capability, i.e., the service requests and reports defined in ECSS-E-7041A. There must be at least one test case created for each situation in which the requests may be received (by situations we mean, the different values carried into packet fields, that not all values of each set have to be tested. By applying the BVA to each set, it is possible to achieve a reasonable set of test cases. All the specified reports should be covered by at least one test or fault case.
Fault cases are similar to test cases, except that they represent all the exceptional situations and fault handling. The external faults defined within the problem domain, such as memory and communication faults, help to derive the fault cases. Assumptions about the service testability (i.e., the points of control and observation) are required for definition of the tests. Only observable inputs and outputs are mapped for the conformance requirements. In order to automate some steps in the generation of test and fault cases, we propose a new approach, using a formal step-by-step methodology. This methodology 16, 17 is shortly presented in Section IV.
Besides the points of control and observation, facilities for executing the tests and injecting the faults also influence the definition of cases in ATS. The test architecture strongly affects the conformance requirements that can effectively be checked by the testing means 18 . As a result of previous research we have adopted the ferry-injection architecture, which is illustrated in Figure 4 , to run the tests and execute fault-injection 19 . In this architecture, the testing system and the system under test are as independent as possible of each other. This independence is obtained by the ferry-clip concept, whose idea is to transport test data transparently from the testing system to the system under test 20, 21 . Once the test/fault cases are defined, they may be translated into either TTCN 5 testing notation or to a language supported by an automated testing tool. Each test/fault case is associated to an expected output.
This information is later used in the Analyze test result activity in the last phase.
3) Select and parameterize the test cases: this activity starts the test operation phase. It is characterized by the choice of the test/fault cases, from the ATS. This choice takes into account not only the test architecture, but also the testability of the UUT. The selected cases are completed and parameterized, with the provided values of counters and timers documented in ICS and IXIT. Here, the parameterized test and fault cases are translated into an executable language. In this stage, the test set is named parameterized executable test suite (PETS). In CoFI, the PETS may be written in PLUTO 24 , or in any other script-like language. 
IV.Approach for specifying the ATS
The specifying ATS activity, defined in the CoFI process (see section III), includes an approach to derive the abstract test and fault cases. This approach requires the tester to translate the service specification into a formal notation, a Finite State Machine.
On the one hand, the formal notation-based specification allows the use of formal algorithms to automatically generate test cases, thereby significantly reducing time and effort with tests and assuring a greater coverage of the specification. On the other hand, however, getting the specification into a formal notation is hard and timeconsuming work, requiring much iteration 25 .
In order to reduce the difficulty of creating a formal and complete specification, the CoFI approach comprises a set of steps that make use of UML notation and the definition of scenarios. Scenarios of normal situations are written in separated diagrams from scenarios of exceptional situations. From the former the test cases are generated and from the latter, the fault cases are generated. Thus, the total number of cases generated from each diagram is smaller when compared to that used from a global modeling. The exceptional scenarios represent all the exceptions; cover the error codes to be dealt with by the service.
Literature has already addressed on some rules to describe and identify scenarios 
V.Abstract test and fault case for the ECSS-E-70-41A
This section presents an overview of the approach to derive test and fault cases applied to the specified telecommand verification service 3 . According to the ECSS_E_7041A, the telecommand packet structure is composed by a header and a packet data field as shown in figure 5 . The telecommand verification service provides feedback about the execution of a given telecommand at any of its meaningful stages. In long term execution, telecommands usually pass through the following stages: reception, execution start, execution progress and, execution completion. In deep space missions these stages may take hours.
So, when requiring this service, the client should indicate which reports he or she wants. This indication is done by setting any of the four-bits of the Ack field of the packet data field. The Ack bits, when set on 1 indicates that the service is required to generate the the respective reports: acceptance-report, start-report, progress-report and completion-report respectively. Test case: In step 3 (see Section IV), the requests and reports are obtained from the capability set (see Table 2 ); the operational variables are obtained from the Ack bits whose four-bit combination leads one to deduce the groundon-board communication operational scenarios. The next steps require assumptions about the Points of Control and Observation (PCOs), because only the observable events are taken into account for conformance tests. We are assuming three PCOs for this service: PCO1 -observes the telecommand application data arrival, PCO2 -allows us to recognize the status of the telecommand execution and PCO3 -allows us to observe the generated telemetry reports to be sent to the service client. Figure 6 illustrates the three PCOs for the telecommand verification service. for this scenario is as presented in Table 3 in TTCN. The "?" indicates a received event, the "!" indicates a send operation. PCO1: is the interface with the Packetization Protocol layer. PCO2: is the interface with the application executing the TC. PCO3: is the interface with the ground system TCApp_data: is an event that carries out Telecommand packet data for TC verification purposes.
An example of executable test cases presented in table 4. Intermediary steps of the approach also include the creation of diagrams which have not been included here for the sake of space. ProgNOK, where -in PCO2. The abstract fault case for this scenario is shown in Table 5 in TTCN notation. In 26 the N+ state-based testing strategy, focusing on UML state models developed for object-oriented implementations, is presented. In this strategy, the test cases aim at covering round-trip and sneak paths of a specification given in a state diagram. The sneak paths test illegal or non explicitly-defined transitions, whereas the round-trip covers the explicitly-modeled transitions. A response matrix is created with the complete information about the implementation under test and the sneak paths are developed from the response matrix. Although the N+ is neither for protocol testing nor based on the IS-9646, the idea of distinguishing the normal from exceptional situations when dealing with test case generation was incorporated into the CoFI process.
VII.Conclusion
This paper presented the testing process named CoFI (Conformance and Fault-Injection) which was conceived firstly to improve the validation of the set of services stated in ECSS-E-70-41A. This standard specifies the services for application-process communication between ground and on-board systems, such as, telecommand verification, on-board scheduling operations, on-board monitoring, storage and retrieval, memory and time management, event reporting, etc.
The CoFI is based on the conformance test process standardized in IS-9646 and includes testing activities with software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) to improve the evaluation power of the conformance testing.
In order to provide automation for the testing process, the CoFI includes a test and fault case generation approach based on UML diagram transformation. From these transformations a reusable abstract test suite is created, starting from the standardized specification given in a textual notation. The approach presented here assures not only efficiency of the testing activities, but also improves reliability in the space application software products.
Additionally, it offers a real opportunity to reduce the testing costs in a mission, since it guides the design of the test cases that are still frequently performed by testers by interpreting specifications written in natural language.
The telecommand verification service, defined in the ECSS-E-70-41A space software standard prepared by the European Space Agency, was used to illustrate an abstract test case and a fault case derived from the referred specification.
